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Abstract. This article, which envelops a case study and development of umwelt 
theory, addresses four research questions: At what point does the human umwelt 
emerge? What umwelt transitions can be identified in the ontogenesis of the early 
human umwelt? What is characteristic of the umwelt trajectory of human embryos/
foetuses/infants? How are umwelt objects established/crystallized/fixated in the 
human umwelt?
The early human umwelt is characterized by rapid change, radical transforma-
tions, and gradual establishment of the first and most basic umwelt objects by way 
of exploration and learning. While the human umwelt arguably emerges already at 
the embryonic stage, the sense-saturated umwelt emerges at the foetal stage. Unlike 
an adult human’s umwelt, but like other altricial umwelten, the umwelt of the human 
foetus and infant is not fully functional from the perspective of the organism itself. 
In other words, their basic functioning directly depends on others. Our human soci-
ality is further stimulated by shared undertakings early on in our terrestrial lives 
which effectively make us part of some specific social system.
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1. Introduction
Th e umwelt (Uexküll 1956[1934/1940], cf. also Uexküll 2010), or subjective, expe-
rienced world of a human individual does not emerge in one step, but unfolds via 
a number of radical transformations. Some of these are presented in this article 
about the umwelt of the human embryo, foetus and infant. Th ough only three quite 
short stages of a human lifespan are reviewed, we will see that the question of what 
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it means to be human has very diff erent answers at diff erent points in time in the 
course of human ontogeny. Such realizations might be valuable in a “civilization 
that has long since fallen under the spell of its own signs”, in an era characterized by 
“the adult insistence (expressed in countless forms of grown-up speech and behav-
iour) that real sentience, or subjectivity, is the exclusive possession of humankind” 
(Abram 2010: 42). At their best, infants in particular remind us of our unprejudiced, 
pre-theoretical humanity, and all the things that are possible for us humans – in fact, 
they are the clearest evidence that as a species we are potentially open to the world in 
all its wonder.1
Humankind is not the only species that is not born ‘ready-made’. As Starck and 
Ricklefs (1998: 23) write, many insectivores, all rabbits, many rodents and most 
carnivores 
give birth to small neonates that have closed eyes and ears, and no hair, are gener-
ally poorly developed, and are dependent on maternal care for a long lactation 
period. Newborn marsupials and monotremes are extremes, resembling early 
embryos, even compared to other altricial2 mammals. Precocial3 neonates are 
found among the ungulates […] and several rodent taxa.
Given the general correspondence between physiology and umwelt, the umwelten 
of altricial species are at the beginning of life radically diff erent from the umwelten 
of precocial species. Briefl y put, whereas precocial umwelten are largely functional 
from the outset, atricial umwelten become fully functional only gradually. In this 
sense the umwelt of the human embryo, foetus and infant are, unlike that of normal 
adult human beings, not fully functional.4 
Just as the characteristic features of mammals imply that all mammal umwelten 
have a few things in common  – including perception of lactation  – all vertebrate 
umwelten are based on the physiological trait of the dorsal nerve cord, an embryonic 
1 By saying this I intend to say neither that humans are in practice predominantly open to 
the world, nor that animals cannot be. First, most adult (and adolescent) humans are prone 
to commit the ‘anthropocentric mistake’ (Tønnessen 2011: 77) which amounts to confusing 
human reality with reality as such. Second, as Lestel (2011: 84) proclaims, the animal “invents 
and innovates”; animals “are individuals which do not always behave as they “should” according 
to the species-specifi c schemes developed by scientists.” 
2 Individuals of ‘altricial’ species, whether mammals or birds, are relatively helpless as 
newborn/newly hatched, and require adult care.
3 Individuals of ‘precocial’ species are relatively mature and mobile from the moment of 
birth or hatching, and thus quite independent from the outset.
4 When making use of umwelt theory, we must be aware that the model organism in Uexküll’s 
theory is an adult organism, and that there are notable exceptions, such as the ones just 
mentioned. In these cases his dictum that an animal’s umwelt only consists of those questions 
that the animal can answer does not apply.
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feature which is later modifi ed to become the central nervous system. Th is in turn 
makes vertebrate umwelten radically diff erent from invertebrate umwelten, in par-
ticular with respect to the appearance of umwelt objects proper.
1.1. The anatomy of the early human umwelt
A key explanation of the enormous fl exibility of human beings in behavioural terms 
has to do with the constraint of the birth canal and our big heads. As Marcello 
Barbieri (2012: 457) puts it,
[i]n all other mammals, the wiring of the brain takes place almost completely in 
the dark and protected environment of the uterus, whereas in our species, it takes 
place predominantly outside the uterus, where the body is exposed to the lights, 
the sounds and the smells of a constantly changing environment.
As we shall see, the human foetus as well is eventually exposed to sounds, lights and 
other sensations. Nevertheless, Barbieri is on to something of great signifi cance, 
namely, that human beings are distinguished by being born functionally premature. 
He builds on the work of Adolf Portmann (1941, 1945), who noted the shortness of 
our gestation period relative to lifespan compared with other mammals. Our early 
birth eff ectively implies that “the foetal development of our brain [has been split] into 
two distinct processes, one within and one without the uterus” (Barbieri 2012: 460). 
Th e latter phase lasts for the whole fi rst year aft er birth. Th is is the crucial biological 
background for our species’ character of being a generalist species. Th e implication 
is that before the structure of our brain has been fi xed, we have been socialized to 
a considerable degree. Aft er the wiring of the brain has occurred, there are much 
stricter limits to what we can readily adjust to. So while in the fi rst year aft er birth 
we are principally open to the world, in the second we are already part of some social 
system (beyond that of the mother-and-infant, which is somewhat social already in its 
earlier confi guration as mother-and-foetus). Martin (2013: 128) supports Portmann’s 
characterization of the condition of the human newborn as secondarily altricial, not-
ing that “aside from brain development, newborn human infants are in most other 
respects like other precocial off spring”. What is distinctively human is not being born 
immature as such, but being born with an underdeveloped brain compared to the 
adult brain, and the rapid brain growth that takes place aft er birth. In many other 
mammals, the transition from fast to slow brain growth is associated with opening of 
the eyes and ears. “Human infants are unusual in having open eyes and ears during a 
yearlong period of fetal-type brain growth aft er birth” (Martin 2013: 128).5 It is this 
5 On a more general note, Kleisner (2008: 213) remarks that it “is highly probable that prior 
to the emergence of vision, most organisms had a semitransparent surface not dissimilar from 
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fact that allows humans to interact with their environment at a formative stage, and 
that has been “hugely infl uential in the gradual emergence of greater adaptability and 
behavioural fl exibility during human evolution” (Martin 2013: 128).6 In Portmann’s 
words (1990: 132), “[t]here are very sound grounds for designating this fi rst year aft er 
birth as the ‘year in the social womb.’ ”
Brain development and some other physiological developments are shown in 
rough terms in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Each organ and physiological system develops according to its own time-plan. At 
birth only some are fully developed.
As the fi gure shows, the development of both Wirkorgane (Uexküll’s term for eff ec-
tual organs) and Merkorgane (his term for perceptual organs) takes place partly in 
the womb and partly aft er birth. While the heart starts beating long before it has 
acquired its fi nal form, the teeth usually only show up and become functional quite 
the milky whitish semitransparent coloring of vertebrate embryos”. Building on Portmann, 
Kleisner defi nes ‘semantic organs’ as phenomena which enter the umwelt of another 
interpreter – “every semantic organ exists at the interface between the expression of physical 
features and their interpretation” (Kleisner 2008: 217). As far as I can tell, Kleisner’s hypothesis 
makes good sense.
6  In this respect the character of the human brain of being underdeveloped at the time of 
birth is much more important than its absolute or relative size. Th ough it is surely signifi cant 
that through hominid evolution the size of the brain has tripled, the brain of the lesser mouse 
lemur is relatively bigger than the human brain, and the brain of the sperm whale is about fi ve 
times bigger in absolute terms (Martin 2013: 130, 140).
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some time aft er birth. Since the digestive system also takes time to develop, a human 
infant is only ready for solid food six months or so aft er birth. Th e gradual devel-
opment of musculature implies that a newborn is physically neither able to walk 
nor lift  its head. Among the implications of the brain’s gradual development is that 
a sense of self only emerges, and language acquisition7 only occurs, several months 
aft er birth. However, the skin is for the most part developed, so the newborn can feel 
this new world of hers, just as she could feel the landscape of the womb, while all the 
sensory organs are in rapid development and already working.
1.2. The ontogeny of the early human medium
Th e ontogeny of the early human medium (the medium representing one of the four 
most common types of functional cycles in Uexküll’s view) can be said to involve 
three stages: (1) the embryonic medium (gradually in utero); (2) the foetal medium 
(in utero) and (3) the infant medium (terrestrial). In somewhat more detail, we can 
describe these three initial stages of the ontogenesis of the human medium like this:
(1)  Th e embryonic medium: Embryo transforming from (I) being free/loose in the 
ovary via (II) being transported to the uterus via uterine tube to (III) being 
implanted in the uterine wall, and then to (IV) being free-fl oating but con-
nected to its mother via the umbilical cord.
(2) Th e foetal medium: In utero, aquatic, the space gradually transforming from 
spacious to confi ned, eventually with head fi xed.
(3) Th e infant medium: Terrestrial, increasingly bigger; infant physically uncon-
nected to mother; transforming from orientation lying-down (looking up) to 
orientation sitting (looking ahead) or crawling (looking down, looking ahead) 
or walking (looking ahead); and from immobility to mobility.
It is hard to say what subjective experience looks like at the embryonic stage, given 
that the senses only emerge at the foetal stage. At the foetal stage we can safely 
assume that we gradually experience our medium fi rst-hand (sic) qua whole persons 
whose experience is one and not decentralized in form of cellular biosemiosis only. 
Yet it is unlikely that we have any experience of being upside down in the fi nal phase 
lasting until birth, though we surely experience having our heads fi xed and the even-
tually cramped character of our one and only medium.
7 Language acquisition is not dealt with in this paper, because it is a topic in its own right 
deserving of thorough analysis. I expect to address it in a separate paper on the umwelt of the 
toddler. A further prospective paper could have life (and biosemiosis) before conception as its 
topic.
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As for the infant medium, due to our changing orientation as we start to move 
around in our new, terrestrial medium, we are likely to notice aspects of our sur-
roundings that typically go unnoticed in the adult human umwelt. For instance, 
while lying down on its back an infant might (a few weeks aft er birth) notice the 
play of shadows on the ceiling or the upper parts of the walls; while sitting she might 
notice what goes on at the level of an adult’s feet; and while crawling she might 
notice what lies on the fl oor or the ground. Meanwhile, our mothers have changed 
from being our fi rst landscapes, in the womb, to being landscapes of a diff erent kind. 
In the fi rst months aft er birth, this is (for all but the unfortunate) the place where 
we rest, and the place where we are fed, and even some months later this is the place 
which we can always return to  – our fi rst home, so to speak (long before we start 
associating “home” with a particular residence).
2. Research questions
Aft er these initial sketches of selected aspects of the early human umwelt and its 
physiological underpinnings, I will now present the research questions that I will 
attempt to address in the course of this paper: 
(1)  At what point does the human umwelt emerge?
(2)  What umwelt transitions can be identifi ed in the ontogenesis of the early 
human umwelt?
(3)  What is characteristic of the umwelt trajectory of human embryos/foetuses/
infants?
(4)  How are umwelt objects established/crystallized/fi xated in the human umwelt?
Th e notions of umwelt transition and umwelt trajectory will be explained in the next 
section, along with the tripartite umwelt model.
3. Conceptual framework
3.1. Umwelt transitions
An umwelt transition is defi ned as “a lasting, systematic change, within the life cycle 
of a being, from one typical appearance of its Umwelt to another” (Tønnessen 2009a: 
49). Whereas early human ontogenesis and birth in general represents a regular 
umwelt transition (or several), from a personal viewpoint our own births are sin-
gular, extraordinary umwelt transitions (and they might be so from a third-person 
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perspective too, in so far as a birth in the family radically changes the lives experi-
enced by parents and possibly other family members). In other words, from an exis-
tentialist perspective any human birth is a historic event. Th e umwelt of a human 
being is transitional (i.e., in a process of fundamental change) at least until she or 
he reaches adulthood, and change is particularly rapid and radical in the womb and 
during the fi rst year aft er birth.
3.2. Umwelt trajectories
An umwelt trajectory is defi ned (Tønnessen 2014: 161) “as the course through 
micro- or macro-evolutionary (or cultural) time taken by the umwelt of a creature, 
as defi ned by its changing relations with the umwelten of other creatures” and with 
umwelt objects beyond other living beings. As this defi nition suggests, the umwelt 
trajectory of a human infant, for instance, can be conceived of from three diff erent 
perspectives: (1) from a macro-evolutionary perspective; (2) from a micro-evolu-
tionary perspective; and (3) from a cultural perspective. In this article none of these 
specifi c perspectives will be applied in any detail. In case of human embryos it is 
doubtful that the cultural perspective applies, whereas in the case of human foetuses 
the cultural perspective might apply to some degree, in so far as the foetus is experi-
entially aff ected by culturally determined practices (this will not be examined here). 
As we can see, the umwelt trajectory notion is relational – it emphasizes those 
aspects of an umwelt which have to do with the umwelt carrier’s relations to other 
beings and things. Th e concept represents an aggregate, collective equivalent to 
Uex küll’s notion of the umwelt-tunnel of a single individual creature [Uexküll 
1973[1928]: 108]. Umwelt trajectories can generally be conceived of either as 
sequences of umwelt-tunnels, or as (sequences of) umwelten of larger complexes 
(populations, species, life forms). Sequences of umwelt-tunnels can be relevant 
whenever there are family-bound repeated similarities in experience and/or action 
or other developments of experiential and/or behavioural character. Th e latter con-
ception is most relevant in the context of this article: the course through [ontogeni-
cal] time taken by the umwelt of a [human embryo/foetus/infant], as defi ned by its 
changing relations with other beings and things, where “a [human embryo/foetus/
infant]” is to be understood as a typical human embryo/foetus/infant and thus as 




3.3. The tripartite umwelt model
Th e tripartite umwelt model (fi rst presented in Tønnessen 20118) represents a 
model of Uexküll’s umwelt concept in three diff erent yet interrelated aspects. By core 
umwelt, I mean the aspect of umwelt in which one interacts directly and immedi-
ately with other creatures or umwelt objects. By mediated umwelt, I mean the aspect 
of umwelt in which umwelt objects are encountered indirectly by way of some medi-
ation (memory, fantasy, anticipation, modern media, etc.). By conceptual umwelt, I 
mean the aspect of umwelt in which one navigates among umwelt objects in terms of 
predicative reasoning in general or human language in particular.
But what is meant by predicative reasoning? Initially I simply referred to the men-
tal act of ascribing a specifi c feature to someone or something, and remarked that 
animals that ascribe specifi c features to other living beings or objects as a wilful 
mental act (as opposed to as an automated act of perception) are arguably capable of 
carrying out a fundamental form of logical reasoning. Th is, however, is not nuanced 
enough. On second thought I think there is more to mental acts, and to perceptual 
acts, than will and automation, and I think that what was missing from my fi rst the-
orizing was the category of the habitual. My claim is that we can generally conceive 
of six types, or categories, of acts, and that these can be located within the three dif-
ferent aspects of the umwelt:
Core umwelt
Automated acts of perception
Automated mental acts
Mediated umwelt
Wilful acts of perception
Wilful mental acts
Conceptual umwelt
Habitual acts of perception
Habitual mental acts
By an automated act, I mean the exact and physiologically based matching of some-
thing with something else. By a wilful act, I mean the agenda- and interest-driven 
matching of something with something else. And by a habitual act I mean the 
learned matching of something with something else. 
8 Tønnessen 2011 can be accessed online as http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/
handle/10062/19250/tonnessen_morten.pdf?sequence=1, uploaded December 16, 2011.
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As we implicitly see here, the building bricks of the umwelt can be said to be 
either perceptual or mental.9 While in a wide sense all umwelt “content” is by defi -
nition perceptual, we observe that the mental, wherever it appears, perfuses the 
umwelt. In this sense, an umwelt is either not at all aff ected by the mental, or it is dis-
tinguished by it throughout. Living beings that do not conduct predicative reasoning 
do not have any conceptual aspect to their umwelten, so their umwelten have only 
two aspects. And since the mental only appears in umwelten that have a conceptual 
aspect, the number of acts in the repertoire of non-mental creatures is but two:
Core umwelt
Automated acts of perception
Mediated umwelt
Wilful acts of perception
Th e simplicity of this latter design of an umwelt illustrates the diff erence in complex-
ity between living beings with a mental life and living beings without any mental life. 
Since mental life is correlated with the existence and specifi c structure of a brain, we 
have scientifi c means to ascertain quite a lot about the mental life of other creatures.
While initially I defi ned predicative reasoning as the mental act of ascribing a specifi c 
feature to someone or something, and contrasted it with automated acts of percep-
tion, we now see that it is not constituted by wilful mental acts, but by habitual mental 
acts. Predicative reasoning, in other words, is the learned matching of something with 
something else, in any shape or form. As such, it is diff erent from wilful acts of per-
ception. In general terms automated acts are code-based, whereas both wilful acts and 
habitual acts are interpretation-based. Simple creatures such as bacteria are capable 
of interpretation, and thus of making choices, but they are not capable of predicative 
reasoning. Furthermore, we observe that predicative reasoning, i.e. habitual mental 
acts, must also be distinguished from both automated and wilful mental acts.
4. The embryonic umwelt
In Bedeutungslehre Uexküll (1956[1940], translated into English as Uexküll 2010: 
159–160) applies his familiar musical metaphor to embryonic development:
Biology takes its point of departure from the fact of planned embryonic develop-
ment, which begins in all multicellular animals with the three beats of a simple 
9 Mental acts as I understand them are always associated with a brain. All animals with a 
brain – and only these – conduct mental acts. Perception, however, is in this Uexküllian setting 
a wider term applying to all organisms endowed with an umwelt.
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melody: morula, blastula, gastrula. Th en, as we know, the development of the 
buds of the organs begins, which is fi xed in advance for every animal species. Th is 
proves to us that the sequence of formal development has a musical score which, 
if not sensorily recognizable, still determines the world of the senses.
In Uexküll’s view, embryonic development is planful and unveils the wonder of 
nature – “[t]he meaning rule everywhere intervenes decisively in embryonic develop-
ment and makes sure of the formation of a food utilization organ which grows at the 
right spot for the right carrier of meaning of vegetative or animal food” (Uexküll 2010: 
167). All this is well and good, but it says nothing about the subjective experience of 
the embryo, if such there be. In fact, the notion of “subjectivity” is challenging if not 
impossible to apply at this stage. As Magnus (2011: 41–42) observes in her article on 
Uexküll’s approach to the time-plans of organisms,
[t]he ontogenetic time of the organism can be divided into the time of becoming 
and the time of being. Th e time of becoming equals the time needed for develop-
ing functioning organs; the time of being on the other hand covers the time when 
the organs have acquired their fi nal form and as such are ready for use. […] Th e 
time of becoming, which at least in the case of mammals equals embryogenesis, is 
described by Uexkull as a technical phase of the organism, and the time of being, 
which equals the post-embryonic phase, is characterised as a mechanical phase 
(Uexkull 1973[1928]: 87–90; 1922; 1924: 6–8).
According to Brentari (forthcoming), Uexküll believed that embryonic development 
in itself will “establish little by little the conditions for achieving an ultimate end”, and 
he thus conceived of it as associated with fi nal causality. Central to Uexküll’s approach 
to embryology is his notion of Bauplan, the body plan or physical and functional 
design of an organism (1973[1928]). As Brentari points out this Uexküllian notion 
is not altogether concise, and his use of it is not consistent. What is clear, however, is 
that “the regulating infl ux carried out by the Bauplan in the embryogenetic stage is 
insurmountable” (Brentari, forthcoming).
In the remaining part of this section, I will estimate at what point the human 
umwelt emerges, make a few remarks on the process of becoming human, and point 
out a few further observations on the umwelt of the embryo.
4.1. At what point does the human umwelt emerge?
Given that endosemiosis occurs from the outset – intra-cellular semiosis even before 
conception, in the germ cells – and the fact that Uexküll attributes umwelten even to 
unicellular organisms, it is reasonable to attribute an umwelt to the human embryo. 
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But since the brain only develops at the foetal stage, the embryonic umwelt has only 
two aspects, a core aspect and a mediated umwelt (the latter likely involving antici-
pation only).
Perceptual semiosis understood as tied to sensory capabilities emerges as the 
senses emerge in the life of the foetus, and is thus generally not present in this sense 
in the life of the human embryo.10 Th is marks the emergence of a sense-saturated 
umwelt, as distinguished from a simpler umwelt. With the sense-saturated umwelt 
in place, the developing organism is not only physically one but furthermore expe-
rientially one, and thus capable of responding by conducting actions ranging from 
refl exes to more complex actions. Unlike the embryo, the foetus acts in the strict 
sense of making whole-bodied choices. In a wider sense, even the human zygote 
(fi rst cell aft er conception) – the human qua unicellular – perceives and acts. And 
paradoxically it does so in a more unifi ed manner than the multicellular embryo – 
which nevertheless represents a necessary developmental stage.
4.2. Becoming human
Individuation starts at the embryonic stage, but is only completed much later. As 
Darwin and von Baer (Barbieri, forthcoming) and furthermore Haeckel observed, at 
a certain stage (today called the phylotypic stage, the stage of maximum morpho-
logical similarity) to the naked eye the human embryo is very similar to the embryos 
of other mammals and many other vertebrate animals. Th is phenomenological fact 
underlies the common reference to “Carnegie stages”, which represent a standard-
ized system providing a unifi ed developmental chronology of the vertebrate embryo. 
In terms of umwelt, i.e. subjective experience, we gradually individuate and 
become fi rst animal, then human, then eventually persons.11 At the transition from 
embryo to foetus we are in the process of becoming recognizably human, but as 
we have seen we start out as general animals. Th ese observations are in line with 
Karl Ernst von Baer’s classic view (1828) that in the embryo, general animal features 
10  Interestingly, Chamberlain (1997) reports that experiments show that “[j]ust before 8 
weeks gestational age, the fi rst sensitivity to touch manifests in a set of protective movements to 
avoid a mere hair stroke on the cheek”. At 10 weeks, skin sensitivity extends to the genital area. 
Th is suggests that the tactile sense is the fi rst to emerge, and that elements of a sense-saturated 
umwelt start to develop already at the embryonic stage.
11  Abram (2010) thematizes “becoming animal” in a diff erent sense  – something akin to 
realizing in thought and deed that we do have an animal (wild, embodied) nature, all through 
our lives. In Abram’s sense we do not develop from being animals to being something else. 
But what I am referring to is our becoming general (generic) animals, on the embryonic stage, 
which is something quite diff erent. In this sense any animal becomes a general animal before it 
develops into a specifi c kind of animal (and in some cases even a person). 
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develop before more specifi c features. In accordance with Uexküll’s postulate concern-
ing the correspondence between anatomy/physiology and umwelt, we should perhaps 
refer to the umwelt of the mammalian embryo or the umwelt of the vertebrate embryo, 
rather than the umwelt of the (early) human embryo – at least at the initial stages.
Th ough we generally develop from the generic to the specifi c, it is worth keep-
ing in mind that we, as human beings, retain several characteristics that we have 
in common with other species even as adults. For example, as mammals we share 
physiological traits such as mammary glands, hair and the neocortex with all other 
mammals. Th ese physiological characteristics are refl ected in correlated capacities, 
experiences and behaviours, and in this sense we can talk of a common mammalian 
umwelt even at the adult stage.
4.3. Further observations
In this brief paragraph I address the second and third research question with regard 
to the human embryo. An umwelt transition that can be identifi ed in the ontogen-
esis of the human embryo is related to the embryo’s transition from being fed via 
the yolk sac to being fed via the umbilical cord, which transforms the embryo’s rela-
tion to nutrition. As for the umwelt trajectory of embryos beyond this, in one inter-
pretation the sperm cell and the egg are endowed with each their umwelt, and their 
union in the zygote marks the creation of a merged umwelt, namely the embryonic 
umwelt. Unlike the umwelt trajectory of an adult organism, the umwelt trajectory of 
embryos in general are typically predominantly if not altogether fi xed to following 
one specifi c path. In mammals the relation to the mother organism is particularly 
pertinent.12 For vertebrate embryonic umwelten in general, we may say that epigen-
esis consists of a stepwise physiological unfolding which results in a sense-saturated 
umwelt when the embryo becomes a foetus. 
Last but not least, we observe that the question “What is it like to be an embryo?” 
does not make as much sense as the question “What is it like to be a foetus?” If 
we were to state what it is like to be an embryo and a foetus respectively from an 
experiential point of view, our fi rst remark would be that whereas being an embryo 
amounts to being the unwitting focal point of apparently disjointed, fragmented pro-
cesses of biosemiosis, being a foetus implies, for the fi rst time in ontogenesis, hav-
ing one whole, integrated experience. Just as the cell might very well be the smallest, 
12  Note that one might critically ask in what sense the mother organism is a salient umwelt 
object to the human embryo, as subjectively experienced (it constitutes its immediate medium, 
but is it thereby recognized and objectifi ed as such?). Determining at what point an embryo, 
or foetus, becomes an umwelt object to the mother, at the very least as conscious idea, is much 
more straightforward.
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most basic semiotic system, the umwelt of the early foetus is generally the simplest, 
most basic instance of a sense-saturated umwelt. 
5. The foetal umwelt
Th e common understanding of the concepts “innate” and “inborn” is problematic. 
Both refer to that which is possessed by an organism at birth, and both notions are 
usually contrasted with that which is learned. Th e illegitimate assumption implied 
is that learning in general only occurs aft er birth. Now, surely birth represents a 
world-changing umwelt transition on several points – but it in no way represents the 
beginning of learning. Th e foetus too learns, as it acts and perceives. Th e fact that we 
are born with some abilities, then, does not in itself imply that these abilities are not 
learned but rather inherited. Th ough terrestrial life represents a new (and lasting – 
and ultimate) phase in our lives, it is not at all the case that life begins at birth.
5.1. Umwelt transitions in the foetal umwelt
Perceptual semiosis proper emerges as the senses emerge, one by one, in the life of 
the human foetus. Th is marks the creation of a sense-saturated umwelt. Aspects of 
the foetal Umgebung (surroundings, physical environment) are depicted in Figure 2.
Th e coming to be of a sense-saturated umwelt is certainly the most central um-
welt transition in the foetal umwelt  – or more specifi cally, the transition from a 
“mindless” umwelt to a sense-saturated, mindful umwelt. In terms of the tripartite 
umwelt model, we can observe that once the sense-saturated umwelt emerges there 
is a successive emergence of fi rst the core umwelt and the mediated umwelt, and 
then of the conceptual umwelt as defi ned by the occurrence of predicative reason-
ing. Th is implies that the foetus starts relating to new kinds of objects. With a sense-
saturated umwelt and a brain in development, the human foetus furthermore starts 
to reason, i.e. it (as a whole, as an organism with central coordination) starts to learn 
how to match something with something else. Its knowledge accumulates as the foe-
tus interprets what it experiences.
According to Chamberlain 1997,13 at the foetal stage sensitivity to touch extends 
to palms at 11 weeks, soles at 12 weeks, all of the abdomen and buttocks at 17 weeks, 
and nearly every part of the body by 32 weeks. In parallel, the foetus acquires the 
capacity to stretch and to move its hand to the head or face very early, and the same 
goes for opening and closing the mouth, and swallowing. “Spontaneous movement 
13 Chamberlain, David B. 1997. Th e fetal senses: A classical view. Retrieved from: http://
birthpsychology.com/free-article/fetal-senses-classical-view.
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occurs earliest, probably expressing purely 
individual interests and needs. Evoked 
movement refl ects sensitivity to the envi-
ronment. For example, between 10 and 
15 weeks g.a., when a mother laughs or 
coughs, her fetus moves within seconds” 
(Chamberlain 1997). Th e structures for 
tasting are present at 14 weeks, and the 
nose develops between 11 and 15 weeks. 
Th e foetus’ hearing abilities are evidenced 
by the eff ect that sounds can have on the 
foetal heart rate. By 26 weeks, the heart 
rate is also aff ected by projections of light 
on the abdomen of the mother, which sug-
gests that the foetus has by then acquired 
the sense of vision. It is around this time 
that the foetus starts opening its eyes. 
Chamberlain further notes that “at the 
time of birth, vision is perfectly focused 
from 8 to 12 inches, the distance to a 
mother’s face when feeding at the breast.”
Along with motor skill developments 
(and brain development), the emergence 
of a sense-saturated umwelt enables the foetus to start exploring its own body, and 
its immediate surroundings, mainly by tactile means. As Stuart (2010: 313) remarks, 
[o]ur sensed and felt co-agency begins as soon as movement starts […] Neither 
mouthing nor sucking and licking in this context are involved with eating and 
nutrition, rather they are […] aff ective dialogical means of exploration, and it is 
in this exploration, this non-propositional questioning of its world of felt-being-
with, that the prenate is establishing its fi rst fi eld of values.
5.2. The umwelt trajectory of foetuses
What else is characteristic of the umwelt trajectory of foetuses? Th e mediated umwelt 
develops, e.g., by way of dreaming (i.e., experience-based fantasies experienced during 
sleep). Th e fi rst dreams have little material.14 Gradually anticipation is complemented 
with memories – which in turn aff ect the foetus’ anticipation of events. 
14 Later on, as a young infant, the child will likely dream about life in the womb.
Figure 2. Th e foetal Umgebung. Perceptual 
semiosis proper emerges as the senses 
emerge in the life of the foetus, thus mark-
ing the emergence of a sense-saturated 
umwelt. 
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At this stage the mother of a child, whom the foetus only knows from the inside, 
is its fi rst, original landscape  – mother/Earth. Given the pregnant-woman-and-
foetus symbiosis, referring to the auto-communication of this system is as relevant 
as referring to communication between the two. Th e umwelt of the human foetus, 
writes Stuart (2010: 313–314), “can be better described as its Mitseinwelt15, the felt-
being-with, for its experience is aff ectively-laden co-engagement.” According to 
Stuart (2010: 308–309) enkinaesthesia, “the reciprocally aff ective neuro-muscular 
dynamical fl ows and muscle tensions that are felt and enfolded between co-partic-
ipating agents in dialogical relation with one another”, starts in the womb. We feel 
the presence of someone, and start coordinating our movements with this someone, 
already before birth. Th is arguably represents the beginning of human sociality.
6. The infant umwelt
At birth we are already somewhat attuned to the ways of our mother. But sociali-
zation intensifi es dramatically in the fi rst year aft er birth. As Th ibault (2000: 294) 
observes, research into infant semiosis “shows very clearly that from the very earli-
est stages of the child’s meaning-making, that is, well before the onset of language, 
the processes involved are in fact fundamentally dialogic and intersubjective.”16 And 
infants are not simply being raised by adults. In Hodges’ words (2007: 587), 
[c]hildren […] are not passive recipients of guidance by adults; rather, children’s 
actions increasingly scaff old the activities of caretakers. By nine months, if not 
sooner, children are babbling, taking a major role in games, resisting the infl uence 
of adults, and to some extent setting their own agendas[.]
Th e further development of sociality in infancy and beyond is refl ected in gradu-
ally decreasing dependency on others. Unlike an human adult’s umwelt, the umwelt 
of the human infant (and foetus) is not fully functional – and this is the case in two 
senses: Firstly, several of the umwelt objects in these umwelten are not concise and 
stable, but diff use and unstable. And secondly, since both the foetus and the infant 
depend on the actions of others, important biological functions are carried out in a 
15 A term coined by Martin Heidegger; literally the world of “being-with”.
16 As Sears (2003: 76) points out, video-analysis “of mothers talking to their newborns 
shows the babies moving their heads in a rhythm synchronized with their mother’s speech. 
[…] Analysis shows that the length of time mother pauses between bursts of language exactly 
equals the length of the response from her baby. Th us what seems like a monologue to a casual 
observer is really a dialogue”. 
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distributed manner, by others, not by the organism itself. In short, this has the eff ect 
that the infant cannot make it on its own, but depends on being cared for.
Abram (2010: 38) succinctly states that
[f]or a long while, the soft  body of our mother, with her pliant breasts and warm 
belly, her deep eyes and gentle voice, is coextensive with the rest of the world. 
Slowly, however, this nourishing presence diff erentiates into a plurality of inter-
penetrating dimensions, into mothertouch and groundtouch and skyglow and 
night (into ticklegrass and fathersong), all echoed by a deepening diff erentiation 
within oneself, as the body learns to coordinate the actions of its various limbs and 
to move within the cosmos.
Figure 3 illustrates the infant umwelt.
Figure 3. Th e infant umwelt: What are the characteristics of the subjective, experienced world 
of the human infant? Photo by the author.
One of the illustrations in Uexküll’s Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und 
Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten (Uexküll 1956[1934/1940]: 43; cf. 
Uexküll 2010: 67) shows a church as seen by a child and an adult. His point (Uexküll 
2010: 69) is that we must imagine animals and humans “as having a soap bubble 
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around them, closed on all sides, which closes off  their visual space and in which 
everything visible for the subject is also enclosed”. Visual space is according to 
Uexküll (2010: 63) walled about by an “impenetrable wall, which we shall call the 
horizon or the farthest plane”. Th e farthest plane determines what objects we see in 
terms of enlargement and shrinking, as opposed to the closer objects which we see 
as near or far. Uexküll stresses that objects have “entirely diff erent dimensions” in the 
umwelten of adults and children. Th e newborn’s visual space is characterized by “an 
all-encompassing farthest plane” (Uexküll 2010: 66) – in other words, to the new-
born human being, for whom depth vision is poorly developed, no objects are expe-
rienced as being near or far, instead they are experienced as increasing or decreasing 
in size.
In the remaining part of this section, which concludes the current article, I will 
fi rst outline some umwelt transitions in the infant umwelt and comment on the 
umwelt trajectory of infants. Given the richness of infancy, I will proceed to sketch 
the ontogeny of the infant Wirkwelt (world of action), and then end by theorizing on 
the establishment of umwelt objects. 
6.1. Umwelt transitions in the infant umwelt
Th e umwelt transitions in infancy are too many to mention systematically in the 
scope of this article. Some of the most important ones, however, are related to 
 being born (terrestrial medium, breathing, out-of-the womb sensations, 
mother transforming from medium to social companion);
 being breast-fed;
 gradually expanding social, enkinaesthetic interaction and coaction; 
 objects explored by tactile and gustatory means;
 gradual emerging sense of self and other;
 starting to eat solid foods;
 changing sleep patterns; 
 starting to walk (via sitting and perhaps crawling);
 slowly learning to make use of language.
Besides these umwelt transitions in the life of the infant, we can observe that as a 
result of the birth of an infant, umwelt transitions of a social character occur in the 
lives of parents, siblings, and other relatives, all of which “become” something new 
(mother, father, brother, sister, etc.).
Figure 4 alludes to infant exploration and discovery, which gradually becomes 
increasingly central to the human infant. Th e pathways of exploration are largely 
governed by the development of various motor skills. 
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Figure 4. Th e infant umwelt is characterized by exploration and discovery as the infant learns to 
control its limbs and to make deliberate use of its senses. Photo by the author. 
In her doctoral thesis on picture understanding in young children, Lenninger (2012: 
182–183) distinguishes between iconization  – i.e., generalization anchored in the 
individual’s selection of similarities and dissimilarities – and conventionalization, i.e. 
generalization as fi ltered by culture. She notes that by fi ve months of age, infants start 
perceiving objects in realistic pictures as salient. According to her analysis, there are 
three developmental phases at the infant stage: 
(1) In the very fi rst months, visual features are organised meaningfully (for 
instance, faces are recognized) even though the child does not yet experience 
similarities and dissimilarities; 
(2) from fi ve months of age or so iconization dominates, and 
(3) by 12–15 months of age children start distinguishing between the picture 
and the objects in the picture.
Conventionalization, “like iconization, […] infl uences infants’ making of mean-
ing from the start”, Lenninger (2012: 183) observes, but given that it is grounded in 
social interaction it becomes gradually more important. “It is the dominant means of 
meaning construction in […] communication games, which come to play a promi-
nent role before the end of the child’s fi rst year” (Lenninger 2012: 183).
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6.2. The umwelt trajectory of infants
What else is characteristic of the umwelt trajectory of infants? While Freud and 
Piaget portrayed the newborn human as asocial and egocentric, Martin Buber 
(1970[1923]), who took a phenomenological stance, was in Bråten’s words (2009: 3) 
one of three seminal thinkers whose work in the 1920s pointed in another direction. 
To Buber, the I-Th ou relationship (e.g. between mother and child) is unmediated, 
and nothing intervenes between the I and the Th ou. Th ough the mother-and-child is 
still in some ways one living system, birth represents the individuation event per se. 
Aft er birth Mother remains a landscape, but gradually the child orients itself more 
widely. In Neumann and Cowley’s words (2013), “[t]he baby attends to repeated 
action or, in Maturana’s terms (1978), how each orients to the orienting of the other.” 
Hrdy (2009a; cf. also 2009b) examines human evolution, and theorizes that 
our empathetic impulses grew out of the peculiar way that children in the genus 
Homo were reared. I believe that at an early stage in human evolution, our bipedal 
ape ancestors were increasingly cared for and provisioned not just by parents but 
also by other group members, known as alloparents.
“Shared care”, claims Hrdy (2009a), “coevolved with empathetic awareness; mothers 
and infants benefi ted from intuiting who would help and who would hurt.” As Zlatev 
(2012: 12) summarizes:
Reviewing the ethological, anthropological, and developmental psychology litera-
tures, Hrdy builds up a case for the proposal that the crucial reproductive turn that 
occurred with Homo erectus nearly two million years ago was not to monogamy 
but to alloparenting or “cooperative breeding”. Th at would account both for the 
greater gregariousness of our species towards non-relatives and the willingness of 
infants to bond and communicate with other than biological parents.
Th e infant umwelt is co-constituted by human others via their practical care for the 
infant, which ideally establishes a caring and safe environment.17 
 
17  Th e infl uence goes both ways – the presence of a baby does something to how adults behave, 
too. As Cobley (forthcoming: 236) writes with reference to the work of Malloch and Trevarthen 
(2009), “[a]dults were consistently found not just to be speaking to neonates but doing so in 
tandem with a repertoire of gestures and ‘musicality’, where the latter does not imply only song 
[…] but a particular kind of rhythm in movement and talk […] Th e sing-song way of talking 
to infants, ‘motherese’ (Trevarthen and Delafi eld-Butt 2013), is commonly observed and seems 
almost automatic, despite the content being incomprehensible to the child [...]”.
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6.3. The ontogeny of the infant Wirkwelt
Similarly to the overview in 6.1, the one given in this subsection cannot be compre-
hensive in any way. Th is said, the motor skills of importance in the infant umwelt 
include:
 sucking refl ex;
 grasp refl ex;
 gradually fi ne-tuned facial expressions and gestures;
 gradually fi ne-tuned vocalizations (including of crying);
 voluntary sucking and grasping;
 coordination of hands;
 coordination of hands and feet;
 approaching full-body coordination.
Th e fi ngertips and tip of the tongue are the spots on our human bodies where our 
tactile space is most fi ne-tuned, and our tactile capacities are the most acute. Infants’ 
tendency to put things into their mouths can therefore be motivated not only by gus-
tatory exploration, but tactile exploration as well. By touching an object with the fi n-
gertips, and then putting it into one’s mouth in order to use the tongue to continue 
the examination, the infant has investigated it in the thoroughest way possible by 
tactile means.18
Development of motor skills does not only trigger ever new pathways of explora-
tion and discovery. Th e actual use of motor skills can, perhaps not surprisingly, also 
be of use to the infant. Th is simple fact contributes to confi rm that infants, as human 
beings of other ages, are agenda-driven creatures with a certain awareness of their 
(immediate) interests and needs. In Th ibault’s (2011a: 67) words:
In time, the infant can elicit desired responses in others by calling up the appro-
priate motor command (e.g. proto-imperatives). He or she can control vocal and 
other bodily behaviours in concert with others (and later solo) that establish a 
consensual domain of consistent motor-sensory relationships. Th ese motor-
sensory relationships bias perception in value-weighted ways that lead to higher-
order behavioural control. Th us, control of vocal tract and other gestural activity 
mean that the gesture can be used to get others to fulfi l one’s needs and wants.
Within an Uexküllian framework, umwelt objects have various functional tones. In 
the umwelt of the human infant, these are among the umwelt objects that are central 
(as characterized by their functional tones):
18 Touching is sometimes combined with pointing  – in other words, the infant points at 
something that it simultaneously touches. In this way, it invites another to take part in full-
fl edged, shared exploration.











Given the infant’s sensational preference for repetition of “the new”, virtually all 
things might for a period attain the quality of e.g. grasp-things, shake-things, or 
throw-things. As for play-things, in Tønnessen 2009b: 574–576 I theorize that there 
are broadly speaking four categories of play: role play (predominantly iconic – with 
behavioural/social roles as object of play), sensational play (also called elemental play; 
predominantly indexical  – with the pleasure of sensation being the object of play), 
perceptual play (predominantly symbolic – with rules of perception as object of play), 
and mind games (where privacy of perception is object of play). I further remarked 
that further distinctions can be drawn between social play vs. solitary play, etc. All 
the mentioned categories apply, I think, to infant play at diff erent stages, which prob-
ably starts predominantly with sensational play, followed by perceptual play, and 
eventually role play, which continues in ever new forms throughout childhood.
Figure 5 depicts shared joy.
Figure 5. Th e umwelt of a healthy, thriving infant is characterized by joint undertakings and 
shared joy (and shared sorrows). Its world is fundamentally social. Photo by the author.
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6.4. The establishment of umwelt objects
At around one year aft er birth, infants tend to enjoy repetition of certain simple 
actions that they are in the process of learning to carry out, or have just learned – 
say, to throw this or that on the fl oor, or to place something on top of, or inside, 
something else. From an adult’s perspective, these activities may appear to be some-
what pointless, and the infant’s continued fascination with them is looked upon as 
either entertaining or (eventually) tiresome. From the child’s perspective, however, 
these activities likely do their work by helping to establish umwelt objects and the 
child’s relations to them. Th e child learns and confi rms that a watch, and a remote 
control, has the quality of being throwable by throwing them on the fl oor again and 
again, and likewise learns and confi rms that a tiny basket has the quality of being 
stackable by repeatedly placing one tiny basket on top of another. Th e child learns by 
doing, and does what it learns – i.e., immediately applies, practices, its knowledge – 
at least for as long as the fascination of the new lasts.
Repetition of successful activities is accompanied by  – and oft en preceded 
by – trial and error, i.e. exploration of the possible. Whenever an infant errs in an 
attempted action, an adult might think that the child simply does not know what it is 
doing. For the infant, however, meaning is simply in fl ux, i.e. unstable. Only for the 
adult (or the mature teenager) has the meaning carried by umwelt objects become 
altogether stable and predictable. As mentioned earlier in this article the human 
umwelt is transitional until we reach adulthood. Transitional umwelten are life-
worlds whose objects are in a process of change – emerging, vanishing or changing 
in character. And in some cases, such as in the infant’s umwelt, many umwelt objects 
are not fi xated – their meaning is diff use, unclear or uncertain, rather than concise 
and stable.19
Th e infant phase of human life stands out in the context of establishment of 
umwelt objects, because in this phase a wide range of umwelt objects are established 
for the very fi rst time. Later in life, when umwelt objects acquire new meaning, they 
are in a sense re-established (changed) rather than established (emerging).20 Given 
19 Abram (2010: 32) is on to something similar when he writes about “the way ostensibly 
inert things in a home are drawn into new life by an infant’s curiosity and pleasure – the way 
their shapes are received and welcomed by a small child, and enjoyed in their peculiarity and 
wonder long before those objects are named – before their boundaries become defi nite, their 
strict utility and purpose defi ned”.
20 As Neumann and Cowley (2013: 19) observe, “by 3–4 years of age, second-order constructs 
[linguistic abstrata] (and wordings) exert tight constraints on how children act, think and 
feel”. Language, and the specifi cally human conceptual umwelt, plays a crucial role in the 
establishment of umwelt objects beyond infancy (and to some extent in late infancy). Th ibault 
(2011b: 95), referring to Cowley (2008: 340) and his demonstration of our metalinguistic 
practices guiding us “to seek out words as what we think we hear in vocal activity”, writes 
that [f]or instance, mothers prompt infants to repeat the words that they (mothers) believe to 
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that the sense-saturated umwelt emerges already at the foetal stage, we can talk 
about establishment of umwelt objects in the womb too, but in the foetal umwelt we 
must assume that umwelt objects, at least as a rule, remain diff use – their biologi-
cal function or function elsewise is seldom or never clear-cut. On the other hand, 
from the infant umwelt onwards, one aft er another umwelt objects acquire meanings 
which are gradually specifi ed and eventually fi xated. Th eir meaning is thus, in these 
processes, crystallized, and we can safely and unequivocably say that the umwelt 
objects are being established.
We can somewhat fairly approach the umwelt of the very young human infant 
in light of what Uexküll (1956[1940]: 160, here in my translation) remarked in the 
introduction to Bedeutungslehre, where he recounts an encounter with a colour-
blind acquaintance and criticizes the zoologist Max Hartmann (1876–1962):
If he [the acquaintance] was colour-blind, then Hartmann is meaning-blind. 
He studies the face of nature in the same way as a chemist studies the Sistine 
Madonna. He sees the colours, but not the image. Surely, a chemist can get very far 
with the colour analysis, but it has nothing to do with the image.21
In a similar way, the infant can, from the adult’s perspective, be said to be meaning-
blind in its dealings with objects that do have a function for the adult but not yet for 
the child. Th e focus of the infant oft en lies in simple sensations, shadings, remark-
able details, and so on, rather than in gestalt-like wholes (except for faces, which is a 
notable exception to this rule).22
have a reality that is separate from the material dynamics of fi rst-order languaging behaviour. 
Infants are induced to repeat the verbal pattern qua word and to ignore the behavioural fl ow 
of facial, vocal and bodily expression in which this pattern is embedded. […] Th is reifi cation 
of verbal patterns leads to the idea that meanings are transmitted from one person to another 
and that they exist independently of the behavioural and experiential fl ux of coordinated inter-
individual languaging activity.”
In a sense learning to speak implies learning to forget, or neglect, non-verbal aspects of 
human experience. Vocabulary, grammar and style thus scaff old phenomenological (i.e. 
umwelt) experience. While anything that appears (or appears to appear) to the speechless 
infant exists qua (diff use) umwelt object, the mature human being’s umwelt consists for the 
most part only of those objects that can be named.
21  Th e original reads: “War dieser farbenblind, so ist Hartmann bedeutungsblind. Er steht dem 
Antlitz der Natur gegenüber da wie ein Chemiker vor der Sixtinischen Madonna. Er sieht wohl die 
Farben, aber nicht das Bild. Gewiβ kann ein Chemiker bei der Farbenanalyse sehr weit kommen, 
mit dem Bilde hat es nichts zu tun.” Uexküll’s introduction is unfortunately not included in the 
most recent translation into English, Uexküll 2010.
22  At this stage face recognition appears to be distinctively human. Face recognition might 
have evolved as language evolved, since paying attention to facial expressions signifi cantly 
improves communicative skills, particularly the ability to understand the intentions and 
emotions of another person. It is conceivable that those individuals who were (genetically) 
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To summarize this very last point, while from an adult’s perspective the young 
child is part meaning-blind and part naive, from the infant’s own experiential per-
spective what occurs is that a range of new objects acquire meanings and functions 
(in other words, for all practical purposes, what the infant experiences is that a range 
of new objects emerge).23 It is these that the infant explores, and as the infant strolls 
or totters on, its world keeps growing in range and in depth.24
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Онтогенезис умвельта человека в эмбриональной, 
зародышевой и детской стадии
В статье рассматриваются четыре вопроса: В какой момент возникает умвельт чело-
века? Какие переходы умвельта можно опознать в раннем онтогенезе человека? Что 
характеризует траектории умвельта на разных этапах человеческого развития? Каким 
образом в человеческом умвельте возникают/кристаллизируются/фиксируются объ-
екты умвельта?
Ранний умвельт человека характеризуется быстрым развитием, радикальными 
изменениями и постепенным возникновением первых и основных объектов умвельта 
путем их изучения и обучения. Хотя доказано, что умвельт человека возникает уже в 
эмбриональной стадии, обогащенный чувствами умвельт появляется в стадии заро-
дыша. В отличие от взрослого, умвельт зародыша и ребенка не является с точки зрения 
организма полностью функциональным. Социализации людей способствуют общие 
действия в ранней постэмбриональной стадии.
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Inimese omailma ontogenees embrüonaalses, 
loote ja lapse staadiumis
See artikkel, mis hõlmab üksikjuhtumi vaatlust ning arendab edasi omailmateooriat, puudu-
tab nelja uurimisküsimust: Millisel hetkel tekib inimese omailm? Milliseid omailma ülemine-
kuid saab inimomailma varajases ontogeneesis tuvastada? Mis iseloomustab inimembrüote/
-loodete/-laste omailmatrajektoore? Kuidas on inimese omailmas moodustunud/kristallisee-
runud/fi kseerunud omailmaobjektid?
Inimese varajast omailma iseloomustavad kiired muutused, radikaalsed teisenemised ning 
esimeste ja põhiliste omailmaobjektide järk-järguline moodustumine uurimise ning õppimise 
kaudu. Kuigi inimese omailm tekib tõestatavalt juba embrüonaalses staadiumis, tekib meeltest 
küllastunud omailm lootestaadiumis. Erinevalt täiskasvanud inimese omailmast ei ole inim-
loodete ja lapse omailm organismi kui sellise perspektiivist täiesti funktsionaalne. Inimeste 
sotsialiseerimist stimuleerivad veelgi ühised ettevõtmised varajases postembrüonaalses elus, 
mis muudavad meid tegelikkuses mõne konkreetse sotsiaalse süsteemi osaks.
 
